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COMMENT AND DISCUSSION

Acquiring the Notion of a Dependent Designation: A Respons
Douglas L. Berger
Jay L Garfield

Department of Philosophy, Smith College
Department of Philosophy, Central University of Tibetan Studies
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne
Jan Westerhoff

Department of Philosophy, University of Durham
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defend
of Mulamadhyamakakarika XXIV: 18, arguing that most contemporar
mistranslate the important term prajnaptir upadaya, misreading it a
indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead
ply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged e
in modern scholarship, to CandrakTrti, who, Berger correctly notes
interpretation he rejects.
Berger's analysis, and the reading of the text he suggests is groun
analysis, is insightful and fascinating, and certainly generates an un
Nagarjuna's enterprise that is welcome amid the profusion of such u
We have learned much from it. The central argument, nonetheless, is
significant fallacies, to which we draw attention, not in order to refu
ing, but to indicate that the more generally accepted reading should n
on the strength of this argument.

First, in arguing for his new translation of prajnaptir upadaya, B
many other occurrences of the term prajhapti in the Mulamadhyamak
rences in which it indeed has the ordinary sense of "concept," or "id
He argues (pp. 48-49) on this basis that we should not take it to mean
this in XXIV: 18. Fair enough. But in none of those occurrences does
in the context of the phrase at issue, namely prajnaptir upadaya, and i
occurrence that concerns us. The lexical argument is thus at least a n
Furthermore, all canonical Tibetan translations of prajnaptir upad
brten nas gdags pa, which can only be glossed as a noun derived from

connected by an ablative particle, that is, "dependence [abl] des

should be translated as "dependent designation" (or as one of the man

alents chosen by the many Western translators whom Berger criticize

Of course, Berger might reply that all of these Tibetan translator
Western successors, were in thrall to CandrakTrti. But that would be
ment for at least two reasons. First, at the time of the translation o
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Tibetan, CandrakTrti's star had not yet risen to the zenith it would occupy in Tibet,
and there is little evidence of his thought having substantial impact in India during
this period. Now, to be sure, Tibetan translations circa the ninth century do not by

any means clinch the case, but the fact that these translations were all produced
by teams of eminent Indian pandits and eminent Tibetan scholars and that they are
unanimous should carry some weight.

The second reason takes us to Berger's second fallacy. Berger charges that
CandrakTrti is to blame (pp. 51-56). But this can't be right. It is very hard to make
sense of Buddhapalita's fifth-century commentary following Berger's interpretation.

Indeed Pandeya (2:202) reconstructs Buddhapalita's phrase brten nas gdags pa as
pratTtyaveditavyah ("to be understood as dependent"). Bhavaviveka also writes be
fore CandrakTrti, and indeed CandrakTrti takes issue with much of Bhavaviveka's
reading of the MOlamadhyamakakarika. But CandrakTrti agrees with Bhavaviveka
about how to read XXIV: 18. In PrajhapradJpa, glossing the term in question in the

context of the verse in question, he writes: "Here, brten nas gdags pa(prajhaptir
upadaya) means 'mundane and transcendental conventional expressions.' Thus, it
means 'designation on the basis of the aggregates' (brten nas gdags pa ste/'jig rten pa
dang 'jig rten las 'das pa'i tha snyad 'dod pas nye bas len pa dag la brten nas gdags
pa yin no//)" (230b).
The fact that CandrakTrti and Bhavaviveka disagree about so much lends force to
their agreement on this point. The fact that such great Indian pandits, including both
of these figures as well as Buddhapalita, and, as we shall now see, Pihgala, writing
in a cultural milieu so much closer to that of Nagarjuna than is ours, agree on this
reading suggests that we might wisely defer to their understanding of these terms,
particularly when taken in the context of both these early Indian Madhyamaka com
mentaries.

But we can go a bit further, calling on the corroboration by an authoritative Chi
nese translation by an eminent Indian scholar. In one of the earliest extant commen
taries on the MOlamadhyamakakarika, the Zhonglun cfjfit, translated by KumarajTva
in 409 c.e., Pihgala (ca. fourth century c.e.) writes on this verse, and in particular on
the term jia ming f§|;g (prajnaptir upadaya), treated by Kumarajiva in translation as a
single technical term, as follows: "Emptiness, furthermore, is also empty. It is only in
order to guide and to instruct sentient beings that he explains this by using a provi

sional designation" (sg^tJlS? ° ° Ji^fl^S).1 So in what is arguably
the earliest Madhyamaka commentary, prajnaptir upadaya is taken in this sense, and
Kumarajiva translates it into Chinese in this sense.
We would also like to point out that according to Berger "CandrakTrti's" reading
(which, we argue, is part of the commentarial tradition at least since the fourth cen
tury) is not just philologically unsound, but also unsatisfactory from a philosophical
perspective. He asserts:
if we adopted CandrakTrti's declaration that language lends us nothing more than concep
tual constructions, it would be difficult to understand why such corrections would be re
quired and how they would be distinguished as more true to the way the world works

than alternative constructions.
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Nagarjuna for his own part extols the teachings of enlightened beings above precisely

because those teachings bestow upon us an understanding of what action does as op
posed to what it does not do; otherwise there would be no reason to call the teachings
praised by enlightened beings "truth" (dharma). (p. 57)

But there are of course many reasons that insights of the Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas,
and Sravakas are better than an ordinary person's construction of the world, and
none of these require us to say that their verbal expression is more than conven
tional dependent designation, and in particular that they accurately represent ultimate
reality. Nagarjuna stresses repeatedly (e.g., in verses 52-56 of the VigrahavyavartanT)
that Buddhist teachings such as those specifying which things are auspicious (kusala)
and which are inauspicious do not have to be understood as accounts "true to the
way the world works"; in fact, regarding them as having their nature substantially
(svabhavatas) would contradict the Buddha's own teaching (see Westerhoff 2010).
The value of the teaching of enlightened beings can be understood without interpret
ing them as true in a correspondence-theoretic sense (see also Garfield 2002, p. 3).
Some more skillful, more illuminating constructions might just be better in bringing
us to see that no construction is ultimately true. That is the nature of upaya.

Of course Pingala, Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, and CandrakTrti, as well as
Kumarajiva and all of the great Indian and Tibetan translators who compiled the
Tibetan canon, and all other Western scholars who followed them might be wrong
about the meaning of the crucial term prajnaptir upadaya, and Berger might be right.
But we place our faith here in the tradition.
Note

1 - Taisho T30.33b1 7-18, trans. P. Gregory (personal communication).
References

Berger, Douglas L. 2010. "Acquiring Emptiness: Interpreting Nagarjuna's MMK
XXIV: 1 8." Philosophy East and West 60 (1): 40-64.

Bhavaviveka. Prajnapradipamulamadhyamakakarikavrtti, sDe dge dBu ma tsha
45b4-259b3.

Garfield, Jay L. 2002. Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Inter
pretation. New York: Oxford University Press.

KumarajTva, trans., with commentary by Pingala. 409. Zhonglun (Treatise on
the Middle Way). Taisho Tripitaka, vol. 30, no. 1564.

Pandeya, Raghunath. 2008. The Madhyamakasastram of Nagarjuna. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.

Westerhoff, Jan. 2010. The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna's VigrahavyavartanT.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Jay L Garfield, Jan Westerhoff

This content downloaded from 131.229.64.25 on Thu, 02 Aug 2018 18:29:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

